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Abstract
In games where selfish players compete for resources, they often arrive at equilibria
that are less desirable than the social optimum. To combat this inefficiency, it is common
for some central authority to place tolls on the resources in order to guide these players
to a more advantageous result. In this thesis, we consider the question of how to add tolls
to atomic unsplittable congestion games in order to enforce a specific flow as the unique
equilibrium. We consider this question in the context of both routing games and matroid
congestion games. In the former case, we show that for the class of series-parallel graphs
the nonatomic tolls suffice, and investigate examples for which nonatomic tolls fail. In the
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Congestion games [18] are a class of games in which players selfishly select a subset of re-
sources and incur cost based on the number of players selecting those resources. Congestion
games are a popular topic of study in game theory because they model important real-
world problems, such as how to route traffic in a large transportation or communication
network that has no central authority.
Congestion games are split into several different models, based on the influence each
individual player has on the game. In an atomic game, there are finitely many players who
each choose a single strategy to route their own traffic. In a nonatomic game, there are
infinitely many players, each controlling a negligible amount of traffic. In between these
two definitions, there also exist atomic splittable games, in which the finitely many players
are allowed to divide their traffic fractionally among their available strategies.
Congestion games are further classified by the environment in which they are played.
A network routing game is played on a directed graph G = (V,E), and each player selects
an s  t path to route his portion of the flow from a sink s to a source t. By doing so,
he incurs costs from each edge he selects that depend on the congestion on those edges.
In a matroid congestion game, instead of choosing a path through a network, each player
instead chooses a basis of the matroid M = (E, I). Similarly, he incurs cost based on
how many other players have selected the same elements of his basis. We give a fuller
description of the different types of congestion games in Chapter 2.
The key problem that arises in almost every game is that left to their own devices, even
rational players will often arrive at an outcome that is inferior to the social optimum. For
a simple example of this, consider the following nonatomic routing game, first considered
by Pigou [17]:
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Figure 1.1: Pigou’s example.
In this graph, the cost function c(x) for an edge depends on the amount of flow x routed
through that edge. Suppose infinitely many players each control a very small portion of one
total unit of flow. Then the bottom route is the dominant strategy, since it will never cost
more than the top route, even if every player chooses it. Notice that if any player chooses
the top route, then the bottom route will be less expensive. Therefore, the situation in
which every player chooses the bottom route (and so incurs a cost of 1) is an equilibrium.
However, this solution is not socially optimal. The social optimum of the game is to
send half of the players through the top route, and the other half through the bottom.
In this case, half of the players incur a cost of 1, and the others incur a cost of 1/2. On
average, these players’ costs are 3/4 as expensive compared to before.
The ratio of the total cost between the equilibrium induced by selfish players and the
cost of the social optimum is known as the price of anarchy (PoA), first introduced by
Papadimitriou [16]. Given that the inefficiency of these equilibria is not desirable, it makes
sense to introduce a central authority or network manager whose job is to impose extra
constraints or incentive to push players towards a socially optimal equilibrium.
Perhaps the most natural way to influence players is through the use of tolls, in which
the network manager places a constant toll τe on each resource e. In the previous example,
adding a toll of 1/2 to the bottom edge induces the social optimum as the equilibrium. If
more than half of the users selected the bottom edge, then its cost would be greater than
1, giving incentive to use the top edge instead.
In general, the goal is to find tolls to place on each resource so that the resulting
equilibrium’s cost (including the tolls) is relatively close to the cost of the social optimum.
Tolls are extremely well studied: they were first proposed by Pigou [17] in 1920, and since
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then there have been a multitude of results showing how to use tolls in congestion games.
The nonatomic case is by far the most understood; under mild conditions, it is possible to
compute tolls that induce the optimal flow as the equilibrium [11].
However, much less is understood about tolls in the atomic setting. One hurdle that
bars progress in this setting is that while nonatomic equilibria are unique, atomic equilibria
are not [15]. Therefore, one would need to use tolls to not only induce some flow as an
atomic equilibrium, but the unique one in order to show a positive result mirroring what is
known in the nonatomic setting. In addition, it is important to be careful in how we define
equilibria; the same flow can often arise from different sets of player strategies. Of these,
it is possible that some are equilibria while others are not. To combat this complication,
we define the notion of a “profile-decomposition independent” equilibrium, or a flow that
maintains the properties of an equilibrium regardless of how it is decomposed into player
strategies. We elaborate on these complications and the resulting definition in Section 2.5.
1.1 Our Results and Organization of the Thesis
We show that we can compute tolls to enforce a flow f as the unique profile-decomposition
independent (PDI) atomic equilibrium in a variety of settings.
In chapter 2, we discuss some preliminaries, and precisely define what it means for
an equilibrium to be profile-decomposition independent. This gives the terminology and
notation to state the central problem of this thesis precisely.
In chapter 3, we show that in series-parallel graphs the tolls that induce f as a
nonatomic equilibrium also suffice to impose f as the unique PDI atomic equilibrium
(Theorem 3.1). We then give an example that shows that the nonatomic tolls do not
suffice in general, but also show how to modify these tolls a small amount to create valid
atomic tolls (Proposition 3.3). However, we then show that while a small perturbation of
the nonatomic tolls does not always suffice (Proposition 3.5), we can still compute atomic
tolls that make any f enforceable in our example, given stricter constraints on the cost
functions.
In chapter 4, we develop the relationship between polymatroids and matroid congestion
games. We show in Theorem 4.7 that if the polymatroid associated with a matroid con-
gestion game exhibits the properties in Conjecture 4.6, then the nonatomic tolls will also
suffice in the atomic setting. We then show that Conjecture 4.6 holds for both partition
(Theorem 4.9) and laminar (Theorem 4.14) matroid congestion games.
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In chapter 5, we conclude the thesis by surveying the remaining classes of graphs and
matroids for which our techniques are currently insufficient. In both cases, we discuss what
parts of the structure of our graph and matroid classes were most essential in allowing us
to develop our tools, and consider what aspects of the structure are simplest to remove
first for the purposes of generalizing our results.
1.2 Related Work
The idea of a nonatomic congestion game was first created by Wardrop [24] as a model
for road traffic. The first price of anarchy results for nonatomic routing games were found
by Roughgarden and Tardos [21], who gave tight bounds for games with linear latency
functions. Roughgarden [19, 20] then expanded these results for many other classes of
latency functions.
Tolls were first considered in the literature by Pigou [17]. One issue with adding tolls to
a network is that different users may have a different trade-off between time and money (in
particular, let each player a have a function α(a) that converts latency into money), and
so the same toll may be experienced differently by different players. Beckman, McGuire,
and Winsten [2] showed that adding marginal cost tolls to a Nash flow yields the social
optimum when players’ α functions are identical.. Dafermos [9] and Smith [22] provided
early results on how to compute tolls when each player’s α value is known, and Cole, Dodis,
and Roughgarden [6] found tolls for single commodity networks. As mentioned previously,
Fleisher, Jain and Mahdian [11] generalize this work and give a complete characterization
of flows that are enforceable by tolls in the nonatomic setting.
In atomic splittable routing, various bounds have been developed on the price of anarchy
[3, 7, 12]. Work has also been done to relate the cost of Nash equilibria in atomic splittable
games to their nonatomic counterparts [3, 7, 13]. In addition, Yang and Zhang [25] have
shown that optimal tolls exist in the atomic splittable setting, provided the users are
homogeneous with the same α value. These results were generalized by Swamy [23], who
gave a complete characterization of flows that can be induced as a Nash equilibrium via
tolls.
For atomic unsplittable routing games, some PoA bounds are given by Awerbuch, Azar
and Epstein [1], and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [5], who show that these bounds can
be worse than they are in the other two settings. Caragiannis et al. [4] have shown in their
study of parallel-link graphs with linear cost functions that optimal tolls do not always





2.1 Nonatomic Congestion Games
A nonatomic congestion game consists of a tuple N = (K,E, (Si)i∈K , (ce)e∈E, (di)i∈K),
where K = {1, . . . , k} is a nonempty, finite set of populations, and E = {e1, . . . , em} is a
nonempty, finite set of resources. Players are infinitesimally small, but each population i
together is responsible for di total volume or flow. Each player in population i ∈ K chooses
a strategy P from the strategy set Si, which is a nonempty, finite collection of subsets of
E.
We keep track of the aggregate choices of the players by defining fP ≥ 0 to be the total
volume of players using strategy P . Thus, the fP that encode the choices of population
i must satisfy
∑
P∈Si fP = di, and the choices of the entire population must satisfy this
constraint for all i ∈ K. We will employ a common abuse of notation here, and for
convenience use fe to denote the total volume of players choosing resource e as part of





We refer to fe as the amount of congestion on e, and call f = (fe)e∈E as the congestion
vector. As is clear from the definition, the congestion vector depends on the aggregate
strategy profile (fP )P∈⋃i∈K Si of the players.
Each element e ∈ E has a corresponding cost function ce(fe), where the cost of a
resource depends on its congestion. Nonatomic congestion games involving various condi-
tions on the ce’s have been studied in the literature. For our purposes, we will assume that
each ce is strictly increasing.
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A strategy profile f = (fP )P∈⋃Si of a nonatomic congestion game is said to be a Nash
equilibrium if the following holds:







In words, every strategy chosen is a minimum cost strategy under the congestion vector
f = (fe)e∈E. Another well known definition of Nash equilibria is contained the the following
lemma, used early on by Dafermos and Sparrow [10]:
Lemma 2.1. Let N = (K,E, (Si)i∈K , (ce)e∈E, (di)i∈K) be a nonatomic congestion game
with nondecreasing and continuous edge costs. Then f is a Nash equilibrium iff f is a




e∈E ce(fe)ge, for every
feasible congestion vector g.
Proof. By definition, f is a nonatomic Nash equilibrium iff



















for every feasible flow g. Then, since cP (f) =
∑
e∈P ce(fe) (the cost of a strategy is the



























This inequality is sometimes called the variational characterization of Nash equilibria.
Under mild assumptions, NE exist and can be efficiently computed (within any desired
accuracy). Furthermore, if the latency functions are strictly increasing, then there is a
unique Nash equilibrium. To see this, suppose f and f ′ are two distinct NE. Then
∑
e(fe−




e − fe)ce(f ′e) ≤ 0. Adding, we get that
∑
e(fe − f ′e))(ce(fe)−
ce(f
′
e)) ≤ 0. But since the edge costs are strictly increasing, each term in the summation
is nonnegative, so each term must be 0, and this can only happen if fe = f
′
e for all e.
2.2 Atomic Congestion Games
Atomic congestion games differ from nonatomic congestion games in that our players are no
longer infinitesimally small. An atomic congestion model is given byA = (K,E, (Si)i∈K , (ce)e∈E).
Instead of k populations, K = {1, . . . , k} now denotes k players, each responsible for 1 unit
of flow. Each player i selects a single strategy Pi from their corresponding strategy set
Si, and sends his flow along Pi, thereby loading each resource e ∈ Pi. The congestion on
resource e is simply fe = |{i : e ∈ Pi}|, the number of players selecting that resource. The
cost of each resource e is ce(fe) as before, and so the total cost for player i is
∑
e∈Pi ce(fe),
the sum of the costs for each resource used by the player. The chief difference between an
atomic and nonatomic game is that each player in an atomic game has a noticeable effect
on the congestion of the resources he uses. This correspondingly changes the definition of
a Nash equilibrium.
In an atomic congestion game, a strategy profile {Pi}i∈K is a pure Nash Equilibrium
if no single player is able to improve his cost by switching to some other strategy. More
formally,










Here, the “+1” term comes from the fact that when player i deviates to strategy Qi, he
increases the congestion of the resources in Qi \ Pi by 1. 1 The (pure) Nash equilibria
of atomic congestion games are much less understood, and enjoy fewer nice properties
compared to the equilibria of nonatomic congestion games. It is known that they always
1We have described what are called unweighted atomic congestion games, wherein all players control
the same amount of flow. More generally, player i may control di units of flow, and increases the congestion
of all resources in his chosen strategy by di. In this more general setting, pure Nash equilibria need not
even exist [15], so we do not discuss this model.
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exist, via a potential function argument (see Section 2.4), and can be computed efficiently
in certain settings (e.g. in an atomic routing game, where each player’s strategy set is the
collection of s  t paths). However, unlike the nonatomic setting, equilibria need not be
unique. Moreover, an additional complication is that a congestion vector (fe)e∈E does not
convey all the information about the players’ strategies, and there could be two different
strategy profiles mapping to the same congestion vector, where one them is an NE and the
other is not (see Section 2.5).
2.3 Tolls
One common issue that arises in congestion games with self-interested players is that
equilibria can be inefficient, meaning that an equilibrium can be much more costly than an
optimal congestion vector. One measure that has been studied in the literature to mitigate
this inefficiency is the use of tolls to modify the cost functions in a controlled way so as
to impose the optimal congestion vector (or some other desired congestion vector) as the
equilibrium.
Let τ ∈ RE+ be the toll vector for a congestion game. These tolls add an additional
constant cost to each resource e ∈ E, and so the cost of each resource e is now ce(fe) + τe.
The use of tolls to enforce a desired congestion vector in the nonatomic setting is very
well understood. In particular, Fleisher, Jain and Mahdian [11] show that a congestion
vector f is enforceable as a nonatomic equilibrium iff f is minimal, meaning that if the
same game admits another congestion vector f ′ such that f ′e ≤ fe, for all e ∈ E, then
f ′ = f .
Theorem 2.2. A feasible congestion vector f is enforceable as a nonatomic equilibrium
via tolls iff f is minimal.
Here, feasible simply means that the congestion vector f arises from a strategy profile of
the game. This result has immediate consequences in the atomic setting, since a nonatomic
equilibrium is also an atomic equilibrium. However, as noted earlier, atomic equilibria are
not unique. This motivates the central question of this thesis: for a given congestion vector
f , do there exist tolls that enforce f as the unique atomic equililbrium? We will state this
question more precisely in Section 2.5.
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2.4 Potential Functions
A useful tool for analyzing congestion games is a potential function, which is a single global
function that expresses the incentive of the game’s players to change their strategies. A
potential function φ of a game is a real-valued function defined on the strategy profiles.
It has the property that it “tracks” the change in cost of a deviating player for any single
player’s deviation, and therefore pure Nash equilibria correspond to local minimizers of φ.







The potential function φ is usually viewed as a function mapping congestion vectors to
reals. It has the property that if single player’s deviation from some starting congestion
vector f results in the congestion vector f ′, then φ(f ′) − φ(f) is precisely the change in
the deviating player’s total cost.
Lemma 2.3. Let A = (K,E, (Si)i∈K , (ce)e∈E) be an atomic congestion game. Let f be
the congestion vector created by some strategy profile {Pi}i∈K. Suppose player i for some
i ∈ K changes his strategy from P to P ′, resulting in a new congestion vector f ′. Then



















































The second equality follows from the fact that fe = f
′
e for all e ∈ P ∩P ′ and e /∈ P ∪P ′,
and the final equality follows from the fact that f ′e = fe+1 when e ∈ P ′\P , and fe = f ′e+1
when e ∈ P \ P ′.
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Figure 2.1: A directed graph where flow can be decomposed in multiple ways.
Lemma 2.3 immediately shows that an atomic congestion game always has a pure Nash
equilibrium. If f ∗ is the minimizer of the potential function, and (P1, . . . , Pk) is a strategy
profile yielding f ∗ as the congestion vector, then no deviation by any player can lower the
potential function, and then by the lemma no deviation can decrease a player’s cost.
2.5 Profile-Decomposition Independent Nash Equilib-
ria of Atomic Congestion Games
One of the complications that arises in dealing with equilibria of atomic congestion games
is that the congestion vector f = (fe)e∈E need not map to a unique strategy profile. In
particular, there could be two strategy profiles that map to the same congestion vector,
where one is a Nash equilibrium, and the other is not. Consider the following example
of an atomic routing game – a congestion game arising from a directed graph – where we
have 2 players whose strategy is to pick an s  t path. In this graph, each edge has an
associated cost function ce(x) that depends on the amount of flow x through that edge.
One Nash Equilibrium for the game occurs when both players opt to avoid the expensive
e5 edge and instead pick crossing routes of total cost 3, where one player selects e1 and e4
while the other selects e2 and e3. Now, consider instead what would happen if we routed
the first player along e1 and e2 and the other player through e3 and e4. Clearly this is not a
Nash equilibrium, as the first player incurs a cost of 4, and has incentive to reroute via e5.
However, both of these strategy profiles correspond to the exact same congestion vector
f = (fe1 , fe2 , fe3 , fe4 , fe5) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0), even though only one is a Nash Equilibrium.
Therefore, even if a strategy profile is a NE, it’s possible that the corresponding f is not
a local minimizer of φ.
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In terms of the potential function φ (which only depends on the congestion vector) this
means that we cannot quite use φ to reason about Nash equilibria (other than noting that
the global minimizer of φ does correspond to a NE). In particular, define the neighborhood
of a congestion vector f , denoted NBD(f), to be all congestion vectors that arise via a
single player’s deviation in strategies, where one considers all strategy profiles resulting in
the congestion vector f . This definition allows us to define more precisely what it means
to be a local minimizer of φ. We say that f is a local minimizer of φ if it is the lowest
potential of all of its neighbors, meaning
φ(f) ≤ φ(f ′),∀f ′ ∈ NBD(f).
While Lemma 2.3 would seem to indicate that a NE is a local minimum of φ, the above
example shows that this is not true. In that example, f = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) was an NE, but
f ′ = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1) lies in NBD(f) and has smaller φ value. To circumvent these issues,
and keeping in mind that our goal is to impose a target congestion vector as the unique
equilibria, we define the following special type of equilibrium.
Definition 2.4. f is a Profile-decomposition independent Nash equilibrium (PDI NE) if
every strategy profile that admits f as a congestion vector is a Nash equilibrium.
PDI equilibria are much more mathematically convenient to work with since they allow
us to work with the congestion vector and not worry about how it is decomposed as a
strategy profile. In particular, we can now use the potential function to identify and
reason about such equilibria since PDI equilibria correspond precisely to local minimizers
of φ.
Lemma 2.5. f is a PDI Nash Equilibrium for an atomic congestion game iff f is a local
minimum of φ.
Proof. By definition f is a PDI Nash Equilibrium for an atomic congestion game with
potential function φ iff every strategy profile that gives rise to f is a NE. Equivalently, no
player in any of these strategy profiles can deviate and decrease his cost (and therefore
decrease φ), meaning that f is a local minimum of φ.
Notice that our argument from earlier proving that the global minimizer f ∗ of φ corre-
sponds to a NE shows in fact that f ∗ is a PDI equilibrium. Thus every atomic congestion
game admits at least one PDI equilibrium.
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Since our goal is to find tolls to impose a given target congestion vector f as the unique
atomic equilibrium (modulo player renaming), this implies that f must be a PDI equilib-
rium, and so the PDI property arises as a natural necessary property in this context. We
can now state the question that we study in this thesis precisely; given a target congestion
vector f , find tolls so that after imposing these: (i) f is a PDI equilibrium; and (ii) there
is no other PDI equilibrium.
While both (i) and (ii) mention f being a PDI NE, it is important to note that if f is
the unique atomic equilibrium, then it must also be PDI, since the global minimum of the
potential function is always a PDI equilibrium. However, this does not mean that the use
of PDI in (ii) is redundant; it is entirely possible to have both f as the only PDI atomic
equilibrium and some other non-PDI atomic equilibria that are distinct from f .
In fact, in the earlier example f ′ = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1) is the only PDI atomic equilibrium,
yet f = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) is an atomic equilibrium. These are the only two atomic equilibria.
To see this, observe that if both players choose e5, then there is incentive to deviate to
the bottom route, and if both players select the same ei for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, then at least
one player will have a cost of 4 and prefer to deviate to the top route. Therefore, no
edge is used twice. If neither player chooses e5, and the two players choose disjoint routes,
then the resulting congestion vector is f . The remaining congestion vectors are those in
which one player opts to choose e5, and the other player chooses a subset of the remaining
edges. In all of these cases, if the latter player does not choose exactly e3 and e4 (therefore
creating the congestion vector f ′), he can reduce his cost by doing so. f ′ only admits one
decomposition, so it is necessarily PDI.
2.6 Network Routing Games
In this thesis, we study two structured classes of congestion games, one of which is network
routing games. A network routing game (K,G, (ce)e∈E, (di)i∈K) is a congestion game that
arise from a directed graph G = (V,E). In this game, the ith player (or population of
players, in the nonatomic setting) is associated with a source-sink vertex pair (si, ti), and
its strategy set is the set of all si  ti paths. The edges are the resources, and as before,
each edge e ∈ E has an associated strictly increasing cost function ce(fe) that depends on
the congestion of that edge, and the total cost incurred by a player is simply the sum of
the costs of the edges he chooses. In the atomic case, we only consider the case where all
players have the same source-sink pair, and control one unit of flow (i.e., di = 1).
Observe that in the nonatomic setting, a strategy profile f = fP is a nonatomic equi-
librium if all paths chosen by players are shortest paths under the {ce(fe)} edge costs.
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In the atomic setting, a strategy profile is an atomic equilibrium if no player can reduce
his own cost by choosing another path. Thus, since all players have the same strategy
set (consisting of s  t paths) in the atomic setting we consider, this means that in an
equilibrium, all players incur the same cost.
2.7 Matroid Congestion Gamess
Let E be a finite set and let I be a family of subsets of E, called independent sets. We say
that M = (E, I) is a matroid if the following three axioms hold [8]:
1. The empty set is independent: ∅ ∈ I.
2. Subsets of independent sets are independent: if S ⊆ T ∈ I, then S ∈ I.
3. The exchange property holds : if S, T ∈ I and |S| < |T |, then there exists an e ∈ T \S
such that S ∪ {e} ∈ I.
If B is a maximal subset of A, then we call it a basis of A. The bases of E are also
called the bases of M , and the set of all these bases is B. The rank of a subset S ⊂ E is
the maximum size of an independent subset of A. Using this definition, the rank function
r(S) : 2E 7→ R of a matroid maps sets of elements to their ranks.
We can also play games using the structure of a matroid. An atomic matroid congestion
game is specified by a tuple M = (k,M, (ce)e∈E). There are k players, M = (E, I)
is a matroid defined over a ground set E of “resources”, and each player’s strategy is
to choose a basis B of M . Each element e of the ground set has an associated strictly
increasing cost function ce(fe) that depends on the congestion of resource e. A strategy
profile (B1, . . . , Bk), where Bi is the basis of M chosen by player i, yields the congestion
vector f = (fe)e∈E, where fe = |{i : e ∈ Bi}|. The total cost of player i is then
∑
e∈Bi ce(fe).
We sometimes overload notation and use fB for a basis B to denote the number of players
who choose basis B.
2.7.1 Polymatroids
Our study of matroid congestion games will crucially utilize a polytope associated with
matroids, and more generally submodular functions called a polymatroid. A function
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ρ : 2E → R is called submodular if it satisfies ρ(U) + ρ(V ) ≥ ρ(U ∪ V ) + ρ(U ∩ V ) for all
U, V ⊂ E. The function ρ is monotone if ρ(U) ≤ ρ(V ) for all U ⊆ V , and normalized if
ρ(∅) = 0.
Given a function r : 2E 7→ R+ that is submodular, monotone, and normalized, the pair
(E, r) is called a polymatroid, and the corresponding polymatroid base polytope is







Let N = (K,G, (Si)i∈K , (ce)e∈E, (di)i∈K) be an atomic routing game played on the directed
graph G = (V,E). In this chapter, we only consider games that are symmetric (there is
only one source s and one sink t, and every player chooses a strategy P ∈ S, the set of all
s  t paths) and each player controls one unit of flow (di = 1, for all i ∈ K). Therefore,
we shorten our notation to N = (K,G,S, (ce)e∈E).
Each edge e ∈ E has an associated strictly increasing cost function ce(fe) + τe that
depends on the congestion of edge e and the constant toll on the edge. The total cost for
player i choosing some P ∈ S is
∑
e∈P [ce(fe) + τe], the sum of the costs of all of the edges
in the path chosen by the player. We call f = (fe)e∈E the congestion vector induced by
the players’ strategy profile. We will overload our notation for f and and also allow it to
be indexed by the players’ available strategies when convenient (see Section 3.2).
When brevity is important, we will use cf (e) instead of ce(fe) to mean the cost of edge
e under flow f , and use cf (P ) =
∑
e∈P ce(fe) to mean the total cost incurred by a player
choosing path P under f .
By Theorem 2.2, we know that given a desired minimal congestion vector f we can
enforce it as the nonatomic Nash equilibrium via tolls. In this chapter, we will show that
for some classes of network routing games we can also find tolls that induce f as the unique
PDI atomic equilibrium, and compare these tolls to the nonatomic setting.
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3.1 Series-Parallel Graphs
Directed Series-parallel (SP) with source s and sink t are a class of graphs that are gener-
ated recursively via composition operations. The smallest SP graph consists of just a source
s and sink t that are connected by a single edge. Any two SP graphs can be combined in
either series or parallel to generate another SP graph.
Let G1 and G2 be two SP graphs, with source-sink pairs (s1, t1) and (s2, t2) respectively.
To combine G1 and G2 in series, take the disjoint union of G1 and G2 and then merge t1
and s2. The resulting SP graph G has source s1 and sink t2. To combine G1 and G2 in
parallel, again take the disjoint union of G1 and G2. Now, merge the sources of the two
graphs, and rename it s, and merge the sinks of the two graphs, and rename it t. G has
source-sink pair (s, t).
Suppose we have a nonatomic congestion game (K,G, (ce)e∈E, (di)i∈K) on a series-
parallel graph G where the tolls τ induce the nonatomic equilibrium flow f . Again, assume
that the edge costs are strictly increasing.
Theorem 3.1. Let N = (K,G,S, (ce)e∈E) be an atomic network routing game on the
directed series-parallel graph G = (V,E) with source s and sink t. If τ is a set of tolls that
induces f as the nonatomic equilibrium, then τ also induces f as the unique PDI atomic
equilibrium.
Before proving the theorem, we will first show the following claim about series-parallel
graphs.
Lemma 3.2. Let G = (V,E) be a directed SP graph with source s and sink t. Let f , f ′
be two distinct s − t flows routing D,D′ units of flow respectively, with D ≥ D′, D > 0.
Then, there is some s− t path P such that for every e ∈ P , fe > 0 and fe > f ′e.
Proof. We’ll proceed by induction. In the base case for SP graphs, the graph is simply two
vertices connected by an edge, so the claim is clearly true. Now, consider the series-parallel
graph G which is the combination of two smaller graphs G1 and G2 combined in either
series or parallel.
By induction, we know that the claim holds for both G1 and G2. Therefore, there
exists paths P and Q where P satisfies the inductive hypothesis for G1, and Q satisfies the
inductive hypothesis for G2. In the case that G was created by combining G1 and G2 in
series, concatenating P and Q immediately gives a path with the desired properties. Now,
assume that G was created by combining G1 and G2 in parallel. We know that since f
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routes at least at many units of flow as f ′, it must route at least as many units of flow
through either G1 or G2, otherwise we’d have a contradiction. Assume without loss of
generality that f routes at least as many units of flow through G1 compared to f
′. Then
P satisfies the properties we need by the inductive hypothesis. Both cases have provided
a suitable path, so the claim holds for all series-parallel graphs by induction.
It’s important to note that this lemma is nearly identical to Claim 3.3 from Swamy
[23]. The only difference is that the Swamy’s results only require a path where fe ≥ f ′e.
However, we can extract strict inequality from the proof technique he describes with no
extra effort. We can now prove the theorem. In the following proof, for a vector x ∈ RE+,
define supp(x) := {e : xe > 0}. Therefore, for a congestion vector f , supp(f) is the set of
edges that are used in at least one player’s strategy.
Proof. Since the given set of tolls τ induce a nonatomic equilibrium, we have that for any
given path P used by the flow f ,
∑
e∈P
[ce(fe) + τe] ≤
∑
e′∈Q
[ce′(fe′) + τe′ ]
where Q is an arbitrary path.
Now, to show that τ induces f as an atomic equilibrium, we need that no player has
incentive to deviate. Assume for contradiction that player i can reduce his cost by switching
from P to Q. Thus,
∑
e′∈Q







[ce(fe) + τe] ≤
∑
e′∈Q
[ce′(fe′) + τe′ ] ≤
∑
e′∈Q
[ce′(fe′ + 1) + τe′ ]
where the first inequality follows from f being a nonatomic equilibrium, and the second
from the fact that the edge costs are nondecreasing. Combining these inequality chains,
we see that
∑
e∈P [ce(fe) + τe] <
∑
e∈P [ce(fe) + τe], a contradiction. Therefore, f is indeed
an atomic equilibrium.
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It remains to be shown that f is the unique PDI atomic equilibrium. Assume for
contradiction that some other PDI atomic equilibrium flow f ′ exists. Note that we can
always impose some very large tolls on the edges not in supp(f) and eliminate equilibria
using edges not in supp(f). So we may assume that supp(f ′) ⊆ supp(f). Since f and
f ′ are distinct flows, by Lemma 3.2 there exists a path P such that fe > 0 and fe > f
′
e
for every edge e ∈ P . Since f is PDI, there exists a decomposition of f into an atomic
equilibrium where at least one player uses P . Since both f, f ′ are atomic equilibria they
must be integer flows, and so we have more specifically that fe ≥ f ′e + 1 for each e ∈ P .
Similarly, we can use Lemma 3.2 again to find a path Q such that f ′e
′ > 0 for all e′ ∈ Q
(which means that f ′e > 0 since f
′ sends flow through a subset of the edges used by f)
where fe+ 1 ≤ f ′e for all e ∈ Q. Again, since f ′ is also PDI, there exists a decomposition of
f ′ that is an atomic equilibrium using Q. Now, consider these two decompositions using P









































e∈P ce(fe), a contradiction. Thus, f is the unique PDI atomic equilibrium.
3.2 The Four-Link Graph
While the tolls in the nonatomic case can be extended to the atomic case for SP graphs,
this is not true in general. One of the simplest counterexamples can be shown in the
following network routing game. Consider an atomic routing game played on the following
“four-link” directed graph G = (V,E) on six vertices with edge set E = {e1, . . . , e8}.
This graph is very similar to the one found in Braess’ Paradox; in fact, simply delete
edge e5 and contract e3 and e6 to recover the famous example.
Now, we will consider a simple atomic network routing game played on this graph. Let











Figure 3.1: The four-link graph.
imposed yet). Notice that there are four s t paths, and each of these paths uses exactly
one of e1, e2, e3, or e4. We will call these edges identifying edges, and label the paths that
use them as P1, P2, P3, and P4 respectively.
Consider the path-decomposition fP = (fP1 , fP2 , fP3 , fP4) = (fe1 , fe2 , fe3 , fe4) = (1, 1, 1, 1).
In this four-link example, the amount of flow through these four identifying edges is exactly
the same as the flow on their respective paths. Therefore, the flow through the remaining
four edges is entirely determined by the flow through the identifying edges. For example,
fe5 = fe1 + fe3 , since e5 in an edge in paths P1 and P3. Under f = (1, 1, 1, 1), each of the
four paths cost 5, since there are 2 units of traffic on the outgoing edges of s and incoming
edges to t, and 1 unit of traffic on the other edges. Therefore, zero tolls establish (1, 1, 1, 1)
as a nonatomic equilibrium.
However, zero tolls do not establish a unique equilibrium in the atomic setting. In the
atomic case, in addition to (1, 1, 1, 1), the congestion vectors (2, 0, 0, 2) and (0, 2, 2, 0) are
also atomic equilibria. However, we can impose a small toll to enforce (1, 1, 1, 1) as the
unique equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. Let N = (K,G, (S), (ce)e∈E) be a four player atomic routing game on
the four-link graph. Let the cost functions be ce(x) = ax+ be for all e ∈ E. Let τ7 = ε > 0
be the only nonzero toll, and let ε be arbitrarily small. Then f = (1, 1, 1, 1) is the unique
PDI atomic equilibrium.
Proof. We will first argue that (1, 1, 1, 1) is still an atomic equilibrium. Not including the
arbitrarily small toll on e7, every cost function is integral, so if there is incentive to deviate,
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it must be by an integral amount. Therefore, an ε toll will not provide incentive to deviate,
meaning that (1, 1, 1, 1) is an atomic equilibrium.
Next, we show that neither (2, 0, 0, 2) nor (0, 2, 2, 0) are atomic equilibria. In the former
case, a player using P1 can decrease his cost by ε by switching to P2. In the latter case, a
player using P3 can decrease his cost by ε by switching to P4.
Finally, recall that every other strategy profile had an integral incentive to deviate before
the toll was added. Therefore, since the toll was arbitrarily small, there is still incentive to
deviate in each of these strategy profiles, and so (1, 1, 1, 1) is the unique atomic equilibrium,
and is therefore PDI.
While this set of tolls used in Proposition 3.3 are different from the nonatomic setting,
the two sets of tolls are nearly identical. This begs the question of whether the tolls that
induce f as the unique atomic equilibrium can be created by only modifying some set of
nonatomic tolls by a small amount. More formally, we have:
Question 3.4. Let f be a nonatomic equilibrium under a set of tolls τ . Does there exist
τ ′, which is an arbitrarily small perturbation of τ , such that f is the unique PDI atomic
equilibrium under τ ′?
We can provide a negative answer to this question, even while remaining in the realm
of the four-link example.
Proposition 3.5. Let N = (K,G, (S), (ce)e∈E) be a four player atomic routing game on
the four-link graph. Let ce(x) = 2x for e5, e6, e7, e8 and ce(x) = x otherwise. Let τ be a
set of tolls that induces f = (1, 1, 1, 1) as the nonatomic equilibrium. Then no arbitrarily
small perturbation of τ exists in which (1, 1, 1, 1) is the unique PDI atomic equilibrium.
Proof. We will first show that the proposition holds for a specific set of tolls, and then
prove the result in general. Let τ = ~0. Then every path has the same cost (9), so zero tolls
enforce (1, 1, 1, 1) as the nonatomic equilibrium, and also as an atomic equilibrium. Now,
consider the flow (2, 0, 0, 2). Here, every player incurs a cost of 10. If they switch paths, in
the best case scenario they choose either P2 or P3 and incur cost 11. If they switch from
P1 to P4 or vice versa, they will experience a much higher cost (15). Therefore, we cannot
create arbitrarily small tolls on any edge to encourage one of these players to switch, as
the difference in cost between a player’s current path and the cost they would incur after
deviating is integral. Therefore, (2, 0, 0, 2) remains an atomic equilibrium regardless of how
we construct arbitrarily small tolls.
20
Now, consider any other set of tolls that makes (1, 1, 1, 1) the nonatomic equilibrium.
If (1, 1, 1, 1) is the nonatomic equilibrium, then this necessitates that the cost of all four
paths must be the same. Therefore, when we examine the (2, 0, 0, 2) setting, the difference
in costs between the four paths is identical to the zero tolls case. Thus, it is impossible to
remove (2, 0, 0, 2) as an atomic equilibrium by perturbing our tolls by an arbitrarily small
amount in the general case.
Before proving the main result, we first mention a few important properties of conges-
tion games played on the four-link graph.
• Every congestion vector corresponds to a unique path-decomposition. In particular,
the number of players choosing path Pi is fei . This means that if f is an atomic
equilibrium, it is PDI, since f can only be decomposed one way, modulo player
renaming.
• Each path Pi has three edges. In addition, paths Pi and Pj either share 0 edges or 1
edge, when i 6= j.
• Each path Pi has edge ei which is unique to it. Therefore, we can use tolls to adjust
the cost of any path without affecting the cost of the other three paths. This means
that we can induce f as a nonatomic equilibrium using only τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4, with
zero tolls elsewhere.
• Given a set of tolls τ , we can find another set of tolls τ ′ = (τ ′1, τ ′2, τ ′3, τ ′4, 0, 0, 0, 0) in
which the cost of each path under τ ′ is the same as it was under τ . To construct τ ′,
let τ ′i =
∑
ej∈Pi
τj, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. In this sense, we can always condense our tolls onto
the identifying edges for convenience.
We will now show a lemma that uses the structure of the four-link graph to quickly
describe the situations where a player has incentive to deviate. In this lemma, we will use
the shorthand cf (P ) to mean the cost of path P under the flow f . Additionally, cf+1(P )
is used to mean the cost of P when each of its edges have one extra unit of congestion
compared to f .
Lemma 3.6. Let N = (K,G, (S), (ce)e∈E) be a atomic routing game on the four-link graph.
For a given flow f , and edge costs ce(fe) = afe + be, for all e ∈ E, a player has incentive
to deviate from Pi to Pj iff c(Pi) > c(Pj) + a · |Pj \ Pi|.
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Proof. There is an incentive to deviate from Pi to Pj iff


















= c(Pj) + a · |Pj \ Pi|
This lemma gives a threshold where players will prefer to deviate from Pi to Pj. As
mentioned before the lemma, in the four-link graph two paths share either one edge or no
edges. Therefore, incentive to deviate exists when the difference in path costs differ by
more than 3a or 2a, respectively.
Recall that in Proposition 3.3 we showed than an ε toll on e7 was enough to make
f = (1, 1, 1, 1) the unique PDI atomic equilibrium, provided our cost functions are of the
form ce(x) = ax + be. We will now expand on this result, and show that (1, 1, 1, 1) is still
the unique atomic equilibrium even if we allow negative flow. In particular, we will show
that there is incentive to deviate away from any congestion vector g = (w, x, y, z) when
w + x+ y + z = 4.
Lemma 3.7. Let N = (K,G, (S), (ce)e∈E) be a four player atomic routing game on the
four-link graph. Let the cost functions be ce(x) = ax + be for all e ∈ E. Let τ7 = ε > 0 be
the only nonzero toll, and let ε be arbitrarily small. Then f = (1, 1, 1, 1) is a PDI atomic
equilibrium, and no g = (w, x, y, z) is an atomic equilibrium if w + x+ y + z = 4.
Proof. We have already shown in Proposition 3.3 that f = (1, 1, 1, 1) is an atomic equilib-
rium. We have also shown that g = (w, x, y, z) is not an atomic equilibrium if w+x+y+z =
4 and w, x, y, z ∈ Z≥0.
Let some entry of g be negative. Since g is integral, that entry is at most −1. Assume
for now that w ≤ −1. We calculate cf (P1) and cg(P1), which are
cf (P1) = 3a+ a+ a+ b1 + b3 + b7 + τ7
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and
cg(P1) = 3aw + ax+ ay + b1 + b3 + b7 + τ7
since each unit of flow through P1 contributes 3a to the cost of P1, and each unit of flow
through P2 and P3 contributes a to the cost of P1 (since P2 and P3 share exactly one edge
with P1). Now, the difference in the cost of P1 under g compared to f is
cg(P1)− cf (P1) = 3a(w − 1) + a(x− 1) + a(y − 1)
The minimum decrease in cost of P1 can be found by maximizing this function subject
to w ≤ −1 and w+x+y+z = 4. This minimum decrease is 4a, and happens when w = −1
and (x−1)+(y−1) = 2. To verify this, notice that decreasing w′ further will only serve to
create a larger cost discrepancy, because its 3a coefficient outweighs the combination of the
positive terms. These positive terms are maximized when (x−1)+(y−1) = −(w−1) = 2,
as the combined flow increase through P2 and P3 can be at most the flow decrease through
P1 (since w + x+ y + z = 4).
We now argue that after this 4a decrease in cost of P1, some player will have incentive
to deviate to P1 from one of the other three paths. Recall that before the epsilon toll was
added to e7, f was a nonatomic equilibrium for N , so with the toll, cf (Pi)− cf (P1) is 0 if
i = 3, since P3 also uses e7 and also incurs the epsilon toll, and −ε otherwise.
Now, given that cg(P1) − cf (P1) ≤ −4a < 0, it is impossible that all of the following
inequalities also hold:
• cg(P2)− cf (P2) < 0
• cg(P3)− cf (P3) < 0
• cg(P4)− cf (P4) < 0
If this were the case, then remove the ε toll on e7, and see that every path is lower cost
in g compared to f , contradicting the fact that f is the nonatomic equilibrium under the
original tolls. Thus it must be that at least one of P2, P3, P4 is more expensive under g
than f .
• If cg(P2)− cf (P2) ≥ 0 then
cg(P2) ≥ cf (P2) = cf (P1)− ε ≥ cg(P1) + 4a− ε
.
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• If cg(P3)− cf (P3) ≥ 0 then
cg(P3) ≥ cf (P3) = cf (P1) ≥ cg(P1) + 4a
.
• If If cg(P4)− cf (P4) ≥ 0 then
cg(P4) ≥ cf (P4) = cf (P1)− ε ≥ cg(P1) + 4a− ε
.
In every case, there exists some i ∈ {2, 3, 4} such that
cg(Pi) ≥ cg(P1) + 4a− ε
> cg(P1) + a · |e(P1 \ Pi)|
because |e(P1 \ Pi)| = 3 if i = 4, and |e(P1 \ Pi)| = 2 otherwise. Therefore, by Lemma 3.6,
there is incentive for a player to deviate, and so g is not an atomic equilibrium. Recall that
all of this analysis was done under the assumption that w ≤ −1, meaning that P1 was a
path with significantly less flow in g compared to f . However, under symmetry P1, P2, P3,
and P4 all function identically to each other in the four-link graph, except that only P1 and
P3 are affected by the epsilon toll on e7. The exact same argument can be immediately
used for P3 to show that there is always incentive to deviate to P3 if y ≤ −1.
Nearly identical analysis can be used for P2; the only difference is that P2 does not
incur the extra epsilon cost. In particular, under the ε toll, cf (Pi) − cf (P2) is 0 if i = 4,
since P4 also does not incur the epsilon toll, and ε otherwise. This has a cascading effect
– in the final step, we instead finish with
cg(Pi) ≥ cg(P2) + 4a
> cg(P2) + a · |e(P2 \ Pi)|
for some i ∈ {1, 3, 4}. The analysis for P4 is the same, as it is symmetric to P2. Therefore
in all cases we can show that g is not an atomic equilibrium.
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The reason we extend the results of Proposition 3.3 is that our strategy for the more
general case will be to use tolls to mimic the relative costs of the paths in the 4 player
game. We will expand upon this idea in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.8. Let N = (K,G, (S), (ce)e∈E) be a atomic routing game on the four-link
graph. Let the edge costs be ce(x) = ax+ be. Consider two distinct flows f, f
′, and suppose
that the relative costs of each of the paths in S are identical, meaning cf (Pi) − cf (Pj) =
cf ′(Pi) − cf ′(Pj), for all Pi, Pj ∈ S. Then f is an atomic equilibrium iff f ′ is an atomic
equilibrium.
Proof. f is an atomic equilibrium iff for every Pi ∈ supp(f) and any Pj ∈ S,
cf (Pi) ≤ cf+1(Pj \ Pi) + cf (Pj ∩ Pi)
= cf (Pj) + a · |Pj \ Pi|
by Lemma 3.6. Rearranging terms, we have
cf (Pi)− cf (Pj) ≤ a · |Pj \ Pi|
and then since the relative costs of the paths are identical,
cf ′(Pi)− cf ′(Pj) ≤ a · |Pj \ Pi|.
Therefore,
cf ′(Pi) ≤ cf ′(Pj) + a · |Pj \ Pi|
= cf ′+1(Pj \ Pi) + cf ′(Pj ∩ Pi)
and so f ′ is an atomic equilibrium, as desired.
Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8 yield a very powerful result. Consider some f for an atomic routing
game N on the four-link graph with edge costs ce(fe) = afe + be. Now, construct N ′, a
game that is identical to N except it is only played with 4 players. If we can find a
congestion vector f ′ that imposes the same relative costs on the paths in N ′ as f in N ,
then f ′ is an atomic equilibria iff f is. In our main result, we show that for every feasible
f admitted by N , we can find an f ′ for N ′ that will tell us whether or not f is an atomic
equilibrium.
25
Theorem 3.9. Let N = (K,G, (S), (ce)e∈E) be a atomic routing game on the four-link
graph. Let w, x, y, z ∈ Z≥0. Then for any flow f = (w, x, y, z), there exist tolls τ that
induce f as the unique PDI atomic equilibrium.
Proof. Using Theorem 2.2, we can find a set of tolls τ that induce f as a nonatomic
equilibrium in the nonatomic setting. This only guarantees that the costs of each path
with nonzero flow are the same, so if any Pi has zero flow, adjust the toll τi so that this
path also experiences the same cost as the others (if this toll would need to be negative,
simply increase the tolls on the identifying edges of the other routes instead). Since f is a
nonatomic equilibrium, it is also an atomic equilibrium.
Let N ′ = (K ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}, G, (S), (ce)e∈E) be a nearly identical atomic routing game
to N , with the only change being that this game is played by only four players. Again,
we can find tolls τ ′ that enforce f ′ = (1, 1, 1, 1) as a nonatomic, and therefore atomic,
equilibrium. Note that since both f and f ′ are nonatomic equilibria of their respective
games, cf (Pi)− cf (Pj) = cf ′(Pi)− cf ′(Pj) = 0, for all Pi, Pj ∈ S.
For convenience, update each be in the cost functions of both games to be+τe and be+τ
′
e
respectively, and discard the tolls. Now, add an ε > 0 toll to e7 in both games. In both
cases, f = (w, x, y, z) and f ′ = (1, 1, 1, 1) both remain atomic equilibria for their respective
games. To see this, assume that this is not the case and some player had incentive to
deviate. Since the cost functions are strictly increasing, this player’s new strategy must
cost more than his old one did before the toll was added. Therefore, we can always make
ε small enough to make sure this incentive to deviate doesn’t exist. Note that since we
have only added the same single additive toll to both games, we have maintained that
cf (Pi)− cf (Pj) = cf ′(Pi)− cf ′(Pj), for all Pi, Pj ∈ S.
Now, we will show that any congestion vector g = (w′, x′, y′, z′) 6= f is not an atomic
equilibrium of N . Construct g′ = f ′ + (g − f). Observe that since our cost functions are
linear and g′ = f ′+(g−f), then cg′(Pi) = cf ′(Pi)+cg(Pi)−cf (Pi), for all Pi ∈ S. Similarly,
we can write g = f + (g− f) and so cg(Pi) = cf (Pi) + cg(Pi)− cf (Pi), for all Pi ∈ S. Then
cg′(Pi)− cg′(Pj) = cf ′(Pi) + cg(Pi)− cf (Pi)− cf ′(Pj)− cg(Pj) + cf (Pj)
= cf (Pi) + cg(Pi)− cf (Pi)− cf (Pj)− cg(Pj) + cf (Pj)
= cg(Pi)− cg(Pj)
for all Pi, Pj ∈ S. The second step follows from the fact that cf (Pi) − cf (Pj) = cf ′(Pi) −
cf ′(Pj), for all Pi, Pj ∈ S. Therefore, since cg′(Pi)−cg′(Pj) = cg(Pi)−cg(Pj), by Lemma 3.8
if g′ is not an atomic equilibrium of N ′, then g is not an atomic equilibrium of N .
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Now, since g 6= f , g′ 6= f ′ = (1, 1, 1, 1). For g′ = (g′e1 , g
′
e2
, g′e3 , g
′
e4




+ g′e3 + g
′
e4
= 4, since f ′e1 + f
′
e2
+ f ′e3 + f
′
e4
= 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 4, g′ = f ′ + (g − f),
and g and f have the same total amount of flow since they are from the same game. Then
by Lemma 3.7 g′ is not an atomic equilibrium of N ′, and so g is not an atomic equilibrium




Recall the definition of an atomic matroid congestion game M = (k,M, (ce)e∈E). We are
given a matroid M = (E, I) over a ground set E of “resources”, there are k players, and
each player’s strategy involves choosing a basis of the matroid M . Each element e of the
ground set has an associated strictly increasing cost function ce(fe) that depends on the
congestion of resource e. The total cost for player i is
∑
e∈B ce(fe), the sum of the costs of
all of the elements in the basis chosen by the player. We call f = (fe)e∈E the congestion
vector induced by the players’ strategy profile.
From Theorem 2.2, we know that given a desired minimal congestion vector f we can
enforce it as a nonatomic Nash equilibrium via tolls. In this chapter, we will show that
for certain classes of matroid congestion games, f can also be enforced as the unique PDI
atomic equilibrium.
4.1 Relating Polymatroids to Matroid Congestion Games
Let r(A) : 2E 7→ R be the rank function of the matroid M . It is well known that r is
monotone, submodular, and normalized. Now, observe that we can scale the rank function
by a constant k and maintain the three properties. Therefore, we can scale the polymatroid
(E, r) by k, creating the following polymatroid base polytope.
Pk,r = {x ∈ RE+ |x(U) ≤ kr(U),∀U ⊆ E, x(E) = kr(E)}
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4.1.1 Strategy Profiles and Polymatroids
We will show that congestion vectors of a matroid congestion game correspond precisely
to the integral points of its associated polymatroid.
Theorem 4.1. Let M = (k,M, (ce)e∈E) be a matroid congestion game, and Pk,r be the
associated polymatroid. Then every strategy profile f of M corresponds to an integer point
in Pk,r.
Proof. We first show the easy direction. Let f be a strategy profile of M. Clearly f is
integral. Let f correspond to the strategy profile (B1, . . . , Bk), where each Bi is a basis of
M. Then, f(E) =
∑k
i=1 |Bi| = kr(E), and for any set U , we have f(U) =
∑k
i=1 |Bi∩U | ≤
kr(U) where the inequality is because Bi ∩ U is an independent set.
For the other direction, we will rely on the Matroid Intersection Theorem.
Lemma 4.2. [8] For matroids M1, M2 defined on a ground set S, with rank functions
r1, r2
max{|J | : J ∈ I1 ∩ I2} = min{r1(A) + r2(A) : A ⊆ S}.
We will use matroid intersection to show that integer points f ∈ Pk,r are strategy
profiles. First, create two new matroids. Let E1, . . . , Ek be k disjoint copies of the ground
set E, and E ′ =
⋃
Ei. Let Mi be a copy of M on the ground set Ei, for i = 1, . . . , k. Let




Mk, which has ground set E
′. Let N2 be the matroid on
E ′, where a set J ⊆ E ′ is independent iff it contains at most fe copies of each e ∈ E
Thus, a basis of N1 corresponds to each of the k players choosing a basis of M , and a
basis of N2 contains exactly fe copies of each e ∈ E. Therefore, if we can find a common
independent set of size kr(E) of N1 and N2, which therefore is a common basis of N1 and
N2 f ∈ Pk,r can be decomposed into k bases and therefore corresponds to a strategy profile.
Let r1 and r2 be the rank functions of N1 and N2 respectively. For e ∈ E, let Ce ⊆ E ′
denote the set of all copies of e. Observe that r1(A) =
∑k
i=1 r(A ∩ Ei), and r2(A) =∑
e∈Emin(fe, |Ce ∩ A|).
Therefore, using Lemma 4.2 we want to show that
max{|J | : J ∈ I1 ∩ I2} = min{r1(A) + r2(A) : A ⊆ E ′} ≥ kr(E).
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Note that showing inequality is enough, as the maximum size of an independent set in N1
is clearly kr(E). First, we will argue that for any A ⊂ E ′, we can find A′ ⊂ E ′ such that
r1(A) + r2(A) ≥ r1(A′) + r2(A′), where A′ has the special property that for every e ∈ E,
A′ chooses either all k copies of e or no copy of e.
Essentially, we construct A′ as follows. For any element e, if A contains at most fe
copies of e, then we remove all copies of e from A (so now they belong to A′); otherwise,
we expand A to include all k copes of e (so A′ now contains Ce). In the former case, r1(A
′)
may increase by at most |Ce ∩ A| but r2(A′) decreases by precisely |Ce ∩ A|, and in the
latter case, r1(A
′) cannot increase and r2(A′) remains unchanged. Formally, we have A
′ =⋃
e∈E:|Ce∩A|≥k−f−eCe, and we have established above that r1(A) + r2(A) ≥ r1(A
′) + r2(A′).
What we have shown above is that in the min-expression, we can restrict to sets A that
are of the form
⋃
e∈S Ce for some set S ⊆ E. That is, we have
min{r1(A) + r2(A) : A ⊆ E ′} = min{r1(A′) + r2(A′) : A′ =
⋃
e∈S
Ce, S ⊆ E}.
Now, consider a set A∗ =
⋃
e∈S∗ Ce that minimizes the above expression. We have
r1(A
∗) = kr(S∗) ≥ f(S∗), where the last inequality is because f lies in the polymatroid,
and r2(A∗) =
∑
e/∈S∗ fe = f(S
∗), and so r1(A
∗) + r2(A∗) ≥ f(E) = kr(E).
Therefore, by Lemma 4.2 there exists a common independent set of size kr(E) between
N1 and N2. Since the size of this set is kr(E), it is a basis of N1, so f is decomposable into
k bases and is therefore a strategy profile.
4.1.2 Results on Strategy Profiles
Relating strategy profiles of matroid congestion games to their polymatroid base polytope
allows us to draw from results in polymatroid theory. One property of matroids that is
especially useful to us is Strong Basis Exchange.
Lemma 4.3. [8] For B1, B2 ∈ B, and any x ∈ B1 \ B2, there exists y ∈ B2 \ B1 such that
(B1 \ {x}) ∪ {y} ∈ B, and (B2 ∪ {x}) \ {y} ∈ B.
In the context of polymatroid theory, strong basis exchange manifests itself in the
following analogues of Lemma 4.3 and are given by Murota.
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Lemma 4.4. [14] Let x, y ∈ Pk,r, and suppose xu > yu for some u ∈ E. Then there exists
v ∈ E such that xv < yv and ε > 0 such that:
x+ ε(χv − χu) ∈ Pk,r and y + ε(χu − χv) ∈ Pk,r.
Corollary 4.5. [14] Let x, y be integer points in Pk,r, and suppose xu > yu for some u ∈ E.
Then there exists v ∈ E such that xv < yv and
x− χu + χv ∈ Q and y + χu − χv ∈ Q.
Using these results, we can take existing strategy profiles and find additional ones
by taking a “step” from one strategy profile in the direction of another. As we show in
Section 4.2, it turns out that our central question of whether a target integral congestion
vector f (imposed as a nonatomic equilibrium via tolls) can be imposed as a PDI atomic
equilibrium, is closely related to the following key question: if we take two strategy profiles
g and g′ that are only one step apart, can we can find decompositions of them that isolate
this small difference into only one basis, while the remainder of their decompositions stay
identical? The following conjecture states precisely that this always holds.
Conjecture 4.6. Let g and g′ be integer points in Pk,r, where g
′ = g + χx − χy, for some
x, y ∈ E. Then for the strategy profiles g and g′, g′ ∈ NBD(g).
Recall that g′ ∈ NBD(g) means that there exist decompositions of g and g′ that differ
in exactly one basis. In the next section, we will show that if this conjecture holds, we can
show positive results about the enforeability of atomic equilibria.
4.2 Atomic Equilibria in Matroid Congestion Games
We already know that a given desired congestion vector f can be imposed as a nonatomic
equilibrium via tolls. We will now show that if f is integral and Conjecture 4.6 holds, these
same tolls are sufficient to also enforce f as the unique PDI atomic Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.7. LetM be an atomic matroid congestion game with matroid M = (E, I) and
associated polymatroid base polytope Pk,r. If f is an integral nonatomic Nash Equilibrum
and Conjecture 4.6 holds, then f is also the unique PDI atomic Nash Equilibrium.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that some other PDI atomic Nash Equilibrium g 6= f
exists. Because g is an atomic equilibrium, it is integral and corresponds to a strategy
profile, so g ∈ Pk,r. Similarly, f being a nonatomic equilibrium implies f ∈ Pk,r. Since f 6=
g, there exists x ∈ E such that fx > gx (since f(E) = g(E)). Therefore, by Corollary 4.5,
there exists y ∈ E such that fy < gy, and both f ′ = f + χy − χx and g′ = g + χx − χy are
integral points in Pk,r.
We assume that Conjecture 4.6 holds, so g′ ∈ NBD(g). Since g is an atomic equilib-
rium, it is a local minimum of the potential function, and since g′ ∈ NBD(g) we have
φa(g)− φa(g′) ≤ 0.
or equivalently,
cy(gy)− cx(g′x) ≤ 0
since the difference in potential between two neighboring congestion vectors is exactly the
cost incurred by the single deviating player by switching from resource y to resource x.
Similarly, since f is a nonatomic equilibrium, by Lemma 2.1 f and f ′ satisfy
∑
e∈E
ce(fe)(fe − f ′e) ≤ 0
which when simplified evaluates to
cx(fx) ≤ cy(fy).
Now, we have
cx(fx) ≤ cy(fy) < cy(gy) ≤ cx(g′x) = cx(gx + 1) ≤ cx(fx).
The second inequality here follows from the fact that our cost functions are strictly
increasing, and fy < gy. The equality comes from the definition of g
′, and the last inequality
holds because f and g are integral, and fx > gx. Thus we have that cx(fx) < cx(fx), a
contradiction, proving the theorem.
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The rest of the chapter is dedicated to proving Conjecture 4.6 for certain classes of
matroids. We first provide a proof for the relatively straightforward case of partition
matroids (Section 4.3), and then continue with the more general laminar matroid case
(Section 4.4).
4.3 Proof of Conjecture 4.6 for Partition Matroids
A partition matroid M = (E, I) has its independent sets defined by I = {I : |I ∩ Ei| ≤
r(Ei) for all i = 1, . . . ,m} where m is an integer and E1, . . . , Em form a partition of E.
One thing to note about partition matroids is that every basis B of the matroid contains
exactly r(Ei) elements from each Ei. If B contained fewer than r(Ei) elements from Ei,
we could simply add any element in Ei \B to get a larger independent set.
Observe that proving Conjecture 4.6 entails finding a decomposition of g containing a
basis B such that: (i) y ∈ B, x /∈ B, and (ii) B′ = B ∪ {x} \ {y} is also a basis. If (i) and
(ii) hold, then replacing B in the decomposition of g with B′ yields a decomposition of g′
where only one basis has changed, showing that g′ ∈ NBD(g).
We first show that for any matroid, one can always find a decomposition of g containing
a basis B for which (i) holds. From there, our main task is to show that one can suitably
modify B (and the decomposition of g) while maintaining (i) so that (ii) also holds.
Lemma 4.8. Let M = (E, I) be a matroid with corresponding polymatroid base polytope
Pρ. Let g, g
′ ∈ Pk,r be integral strategy profiles satisfying g′ = g+χx−χy, for some x, y ∈ E.
Then there exists a decomposition D of g containing a basis Bj such that y ∈ Bj, x /∈ Bj.
Proof. Observe that since g′ = g + χx − χy and strategy profiles are nonnegative vectors,
gy > g
′
y ≥ 0. Since gy > 0 and g is integral, gy ≥ 1, so in every decomposition of g there is
some basis B containing y.
Take an arbitrary decomposition D of g and corresponding basis B. If x /∈ B, we are
done, so assume that x ∈ B. We have gx < g′x ≤ k, so there is some basis B′ ∈ D such
that x /∈ B′.
Since x ∈ B \B′, there must also exist some resource z ∈ B′ \B. Note that z 6= y, since
y ∈ B. Now, we can use strong basis exchange to create two new bases B̄ = B−x+ z and
B̄′ = B′ + x− z. Notice that χB̄ + χB̄′ = χB + χB′ , so we can replace B and B′ in D with
B̄ and B̄′ to obtain another decomposition of g. In the new decomposition, y ∈ B̄, x /∈ B̄,
as desired.
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Now, to complete the proof for partition matroids, we need to show that this basis
B from a decomposition of g can be swapped for a suitable B′j to obtain a neighboring
decomposition of g′.
Theorem 4.9. Let M be an atomic matroid congestion game with partition matroid M =
(E, I). Then Conjecture 4.6 holds, i.e. if g and g′ are integral strategy profiles satisfying
g′ = g + χx − χy for some x, y ∈ E, then g′ ∈ NBD(g).
Proof. By Lemma 4.8, there exists a decomposition D of g containing B where y ∈ B, x /∈
B. We now argue that x and y must be in the same partition, say Ei. Suppose not, and
x ∈ Ei, but y /∈ Ei. Then, we have g′(Ei) = g(Ei)+1 = kr(Ei)+1, where the last equality
is because every basis must contain r(Ei) elements from Ei. But then g
′ /∈ Pk,r, which
yields a contradiction.
If x, y ∈ Ei for the same i, then create B′ = B+x−y, and clearly B′ ∈ B because it has
the same number of elements as B in every partition. Now, create D′ := (D\B)∪B′, which
is a decomposition of g′. D and D′ only differ with respect to B and B′, so g′ ∈ NBD(g)
as desired.
4.4 Proof of Conjecture 4.6 for Laminar Matroids
A family of sets F is called a laminar family if for any two sets A,B ∈ F , either A∩B = ∅,
A ⊆ B, or B ⊆ A. A laminar matroid M = (E, I) over a ground set E is defined in terms
of a laminar family F over E, capacities {cap(A)}A∈F , and has independent sets given by
I = {S ⊆ E : |S ∩ A| ≤ cap(A),∀A ∈ F}.
We say that a set S exceeds the capacity of A ∈ F if |S ∩ A| > cap(A). Conversely, if
|S∩A| < cap(A), then we say S does not utilize the full capacity of A. In the remainder of
this section, M = (E, I) is fixed to be the laminar matroid defined by the laminar family
F and capacities {cap(A)}A∈F .
For sets A,B,C ∈ F , if C ⊂ A, then we say C is a descendant of A. If no B exists so
that C ⊂ B ⊂ A, then C is a child of A. Note that by definition S is only independent if it
doesn’t violate the capacity of A, so it follows that cap(A) ≥ r(A) for sets A ∈ F . However,
while rank and capacity are similar for sets A ∈ F , it’s not the case that cap(A) = r(A),
since it may be impossible to fully utilize the capacity of A without violating the capacity
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constraints of its children. An element a ∈ A is called a ring element of A if none of the
children of A contain a.
To aid us in the upcoming proofs, we will introduce another general definition that
exists outside of the laminar framework. We say a set A ⊆ E is g-tight if g(A) = kr(A).
One key observation to make is that if A ⊆ E is g-tight, then if x ∈ A, y ∈ A. Otherwise,
in g′ we’d have g′(A) = g(A) + 1 > kr(A), meaning that g′ is not decomposable.
Before showing that Conjecture 4.6 holds for laminar matroids, we first state a few
properties of circuits found in Cook et al.
Proposition 4.10. [8] Let J be an independent set, and e /∈ J . Then J ∪ {e} contains at
most one circuit.
Proposition 4.11. [8] Let J be a dependent set containing a unique circuit C. Then, for
any e ∈ C, we have that J \ {e} is independent.
We now introduce a few tools admitted by the structure of laminar matroids that will
aid us in the proof.
Lemma 4.12. Let C = B ∪ {e}, where B is a basis of the laminar matroid M = (E, I),
and e /∈ B. Let T be a minimal set of F such that |C ∩ T | > cap(T ). Then, C ∩ T is a
circuit of T .
Proof. We first observe that T is well defined since C is a dependent set. We need to show
that: (i) C ∩ T is a circuit, and (ii) |C ∩ T | = r(T ) + 1. Note that (ii) follows easily from
our assumptions. We have |C ∩ T | > ∩(T ) ≥ r(T ), and since C is a basis plus an element,
we also have |C ∩ T | ≤ r(T ) + 1. Hence, we have |C ∩ T | = r(T ) + 1.
We now argue that C ∩T is a circuit, i.e., the deletion of an arbitrary e′ ∈ C ∩T yields
an independent set. Let B′ = C ∩ T \ {e′}. Consider any set A of the laminar family.
• If A ⊇ T , then |B′ ∩ A| < |C ∩ A| ≤ r(A) + 1, where the last inequality is because
C consists of a basis plus an element. Hence, |B′ ∩ A| ≤ r(A) ≤ cap(A).
• If A ⊂ T , then |C ∩ A| ≤ cap(A) by the minimality of T , so |B′ ∩ A| ≤ cap(A).
• If A ∩ T = ∅, then B′ ∩ A = ∅ since B′ ⊆ T .
So |B′∩A| ≤ cap(A) for all A ∈ F , which means that B′ is independent. Hence, C ∩T
is a circuit.
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Let M|S be the matroid M restricted to S, meaning that the independent sets of M|S
are the independent sets of M that are contained in S. In the upcoming proofs, we will
slightly abuse notation and say that a set A ⊆ E is independent in M|T to mean that A∩T
is independent in M|T , i.e., that A ∩ T is independent in M .
Lemma 4.13. Let C ⊆ E, and let T ∈ F be such that C ∩ T is a circuit of T . Let B ∈ I
satisfy |B ∩ T | < r(T ). Let e ∈ C ∩ T . Then there exists b ∈ ((C \B)∩ T ) \ {e} such that
C \ {b} is a basis of M|T , and B ∪ {b} is independent in M|T .
Proof. First, note that since C ∩ T is a circuit of T , we have |C ∩ T | = r(T ) + 1 and
therefore |(C ∩ T ) \ {e}| = r(T ). B is independent in M , so B is also independent in M|T .
Since |B ∩ T | < r(T ) = |(C ∩ T ) \ {e}|, so we can use the properties of independent sets
to find b ∈ ((C ∩ T ) \ {e}) \ (B ∩ T ) such that B ∪ {b} remains independent in M|T . Since
C∩T is a circuit, and b ∈ C∩T , we have that (C∩T )\{b} = (C \{b})∩T is independent.
By definition, this means that C \ {b} is independent in M |T . |(C \ {b}) ∩ T | = r(T ), so
C \ {b} is a basis of M|T , as desired.
As an additional remark, if C was initially a basis plus one element, B′ := C \ {b} is
not only a basis of M|T , but also a basis of M . If C is a basis plus an element, then C
contains a unique circuit, and this circuit is therefore precisely C ∩ T . Since b ∈ C ∩ T ,
it follows that B′ is independent. Also, |B′| = r(E) since |C| = r(E) + 1. Hence, B′ is a
basis of M .
To prove Conjecture 4.6 for laminar matroids, we will again lean on Lemma 4.8. How-
ever, unlike the partition matroid case, an arbitrary decomposition of g does not necessarily
provide a suitable basis B containing y but not x such that (B ∪ {x}) \ {y} is also a ba-
sis. Our alternative strategy will be to take a starting decomposition of g, and create a
decomposition of g∗ = g + χx = g
′ + χy by adding x to Bj to create some B
∗ containing
both x and y. We will modify this decomposition of g∗ algorithmically until we arrive at
a point where it is possible to delete a copy of x or y from B∗ to return valid neighboring
decompositions of g and g′ respectively.
Theorem 4.14. LetM be an atomic matroid congestion game with laminar matroid M =
(E, I). Then Conjecture 4.6 holds, i.e. if g and g′ are integral strategy profiles satisfying
g′ = g + χx − χy for some x, y ∈ E, then g′ ∈ NBD(g).
Proof. Let g∗ = g + χx = g
′ + χy. By Lemma 4.8, there exists a decomposition of g into
k bases, one of which is Bj satisfying y ∈ Bj, x /∈ Bj. Add x to Bj to create C0. Now,
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replacing Bj with C0 in the decomposition of g yields a decomposition of g
∗ containing
k − 1 bases and C0, which is a basis plus an element.
We will provide an algorithmic method that maintains a decomposition of g∗, denoted
D∗, satisfying various invariants. The decomposition D∗ will contain sets with two special
properties. First, at the beginning of the ith iteration, D∗i contains k − 1 bases and one
other set Ci, which is a basis plus one element. Second, there exists B
∗
i ∈ D∗i containing
both x and y. Note that Ci and B
∗
i are not necessarily distinct; initially, we have C0 = B
∗
0 .
In the following algorithm, we give an iterative process that will eventually terminate,
returning neighboring decompositions D and D′ of g and g′ respectively. At each step in
the algorithm, we will consider a set Ti ∈ F , and perform certain actions depending on
whether y ∈ Ti. The set Ti is obtained via Lemma 4.12: it is a minimal set of F such that
|Ci ∩ Ti| > cap(Ti).
1. Looping. As long as y /∈ Ti, we perform the following steps.
(a) Ti is not g-tight, so find Bi ∈ D∗i such that |Bi ∩ Ti| < r(Ti).
(b) Use Lemma 4.13 to find appropriate b to send from Ci ∩ Ti to Bi. If x ∈ Ci,
set e = x in the lemma to ensure that b 6= x. Otherwise, e can be an arbitrary
element in Ci ∩ Ti.
(c) Create Ci+1 := Bi ∪ {b}, and Bb = Ci \ {b}. Set B∗i+1 := B∗i , unless B∗i = Ci,
in which case set B∗i+1 := B
∗
i \ {b}. Create D∗i+1 by replacing Bi and Ci in D∗i
with Bb and Ci+1.
(d) Ci+1 is a basis plus an element, so use Lemma 4.12 with Ci+1 to find Ti+1 ∈ F
such that Ci+1 ∩ Ti+1 is a circuit of Ti+1.
2. Termination. If y ∈ Ti, then we construct neighboring decompositions of g and g′.
(a) If B∗i = Ci, construct Bx = B
∗
i \ {x} and By = B∗i \ {y}. Return D = (D∗i \
{B∗i }) ∪ {Bx}, D′ = (D∗i \ {B∗i }) ∪ {By}.
(b) If B∗i 6= Ci, find element r ∈ Ci \ B∗i such that the unique circuit in B∗i ∪ {r}
is contained in Ti or some ancestor of Ti. Create Bx := (B
∗
i ∪ {r}) \ {x},
By := (B
∗
i ∪ {r}) \ {y}, and Br := Ci \ {r}.
Return D = (D∗i \ {Ci, B∗i }) ∪ {Br, Bx}, and D′ = (D∗i \ {Ci, B∗i }) ∪ {Br, By}).
There are several things that remain to be shown. We argue all of the following:
1. The looping process preserves our invariants.
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• If D∗i is a decomposition of g∗, so is D∗i+1. During the ith iteration, Bi and Ci
were the only sets modified, and we only exchanged elements between them to
create Bb and Ci+1. Therefore, the number of copies of each element in the
decomposition remains unchanged, so D∗i+1 is a decomposition of g∗.
• We maintain k−1 bases and one basis plus an element in D∗i+1. Bi was originally
a basis, and had an element added to it to create Ci+1, a basis plus an element.
Ci was initially a basis plus an element, and by Lemma 4.13, Bb = Ci \ {b} is a
basis.
• B∗i+1 still contains both x and y. Note that B∗i+1 is B∗i or B∗i \ {b}. In the latter
case, we have b 6= x, since we invoke Lemma 4.13 taking e = x; also b 6= y, since
b ∈ Ti, and y /∈ Ti.
2. The looping process terminates.
• We argue that Ti+1 ⊃ Ti. Notice that b ∈ Ti, and b must be present in the
circuit Ti+1 ∩ Ci+1, since Ci+1 \ {b} = Bi, a basis. So b ∈ Ti+1, implying that
Ti+1 ∩ Ti 6= ∅. Additionally, Ti+1 * Ti, since Ci+1 is independent in M|Ti and
Ci+1 ∩ Ti+1 is a circuit. Therefore, since Ti, Ti+1 ∈ F , Ti+1 ⊃ Ti. As long as we
continue to loop, we will find larger and larger Ti until we eventually find some
Ti containing y.
3. We can find a satisfactory element r in the last termination case 2(b).
• If B∗i 6= Ci, it is a basis. We claim that Ci \ B∗i contains a ring element of
some set R that is Ti or a descendant of Ti. Ci ∩ Ti is a circuit and B∗i is a
basis, so |Ci ∩ Ti| > |B∗i ∩ Ti|. Partition Ti into its children and ring(Ti). By
the pigeonhole principle, Ci will have a larger intersection with one of these
sets. If that set is ring(Ti), we are done. Otherwise, take the child that Ci has
larger intersection with, and consider its ring elements and children. Continuing
this process will either directly lead to a set of ring elements that Ci has larger
intersection with, or lead to a set with no descendants, in which case all of its
elements are ring elements.
• Select an abitrary ring element r ∈ Ci \B∗i from R, and create B∗i ∪ {r} =: Cr.
By Proposition 4.10, Cr contains a unique circuit because B
∗
i is a basis. We
claim that this circuit is not contained in any descendant of Ti. To see this,
observe that for every S ∈ F satisfying R ⊆ S ⊂ Ti, |Ci ∩ S| > |B∗i ∩ S|. By
Lemma 4.12, Ti is a minimal set of F such that |Ci ∩ Ti| > cap(Ti). Therefore,
|Cr ∩ S| ≤ |Ci ∩ S| ≤ cap(S) for every such set S, showing that that Cr ∩ S
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is independent. Since the circuit must contain r and r is a ring element of R,
the circuit also cannot be contained in the descendants of R, and therefore the
circuit in Cr must be contained in Ti or some ancestor of Ti.
• Both x and y are present in the unique circuit contained in Cr. By Lemma 4.12
4.10, there is some A ∈ F such that Cr ∩A is a circuit. We have argued already
that A is Ti or some ancestor of Ti. Therefore, since {x, y} ⊆ Cr ∩ T , it follows
that x and y belong to the unique circuit in Cr. Now create (B
∗
i ∪ {r}) \ {x} =
Cr \{x} =: Bx and (B∗i ∪{r})\{y} = Cr \{y} =: By. By construction, both Bx
and By are bases since removing either x or y from Cr creates an independent
set, and Bx and By are the same size as B
∗
i . Similarly, Br is also a basis since
r is obviously present in the unique circuit contained in Cr.
4. D and D′ are decompositions of g and g′ into k bases that neighbor each other.
• D and D′ contain k bases. If we terminate in step 2(a) with B∗i = Ci, D∗i
contains k − 1 bases and B∗i , which is exchanged for either the basis Bx or By,
so D and D′ contain k bases. If we terminate in step 2(b), D∗i contains k − 2
bases, along with B∗i and Ci. Both of these sets are swapped for bases, so again
we have k bases.
• D and D′ are decompositions of g and g′, respectively. Note that D contains
one less copy of x compared to the decomposition D∗i , and D′ contains one less
copy of y compared to D∗. Since D∗ is a decomposition of g∗ = g+χx = g′+χy,
it follows that D and D′ are decompositions of g and g′ respectively.




In this thesis, we studied the question of how to add tolls to atomic unsplittable congestion
games to induce a desired flow f as the unique atomic Nash equilibrium. To make this
question precise, we introduced the idea of profile-decomposition independent equilibria,
which are congestion vectors that maintain their equilibrium properties regardless of how
they are decomposed into player strategies. Therefore, the precise question that we sought
to answer is “given a target flow vector f , can we find tolls that impose f not only as a
PDI NE, but also as the unique PDI NE?”
We obtained results for both network routing games and matroid congestion games.
For network routing games, we show that in series-parallel graphs, the exact same tolls
that suffice in the nonatomic setting also induce f as the unique PDI NE in the atomic
setting. However, we supply an example (a generalization of Braess’s Paradox) that shows
that the nonatomic tolls do not suffice in general, and show that for general linear cost
functions, even a perturbation of the nonatomic tolls is not always sufficient. At the same
time, we provide positive results on how to compute tolls in this example. Whether or
not tolls exist (and can be computed) for general atomic network routing games remains
an open question. One key structural aspect of our four-link example is that each path
contains an edge not utilized in any other path. Crucially, this guarantees that tolls can
adjusted to change the cost of any one particular path while maintaining the cost of all
other strategies. The class of graphs exhibiting this property may be a natural target for
expanding our results.
For matroid congestion games, we show that our question regarding tolls can be reduced
to a question about the structure of the polymatroid associated with the game. Essentially,
if neighboring points in the polymatroid have neighboring basis decompositions, then the
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nonatomic tolls will suffice for the atomic game as well. We show that this polymatroid
structure does indeed hold for laminar matroids, leading to positive results on tolls for
laminar matroid games. While some of our tools do work in the general matroid setting,
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